Rss Feed Tweeter button Facebook button Technorati button Linkedin button Webonews button Delicious button Digg button

Article 50- a baked-in recipe for failure.

26 October 2018

JR Max Wheel

When some historian comes to write up the tortured negotiations between the UK and the EU they might like to reflect on the now infamous Article 50. This  was a contentious after-thought to Giscard d’Estaing’s EU “constitution”.  It is a mess almost certainly by design and so it has proved in reality. Since no large member state had ever attempted to leave the Union until now, we were always in uncharted waters and the article’s scant detail totally inadequate for the purposes of reaching a fair agreement, since it gives all the negotiating cards to the remaining member states. Worse its sequencing into a two-phase approach means that many issues which are needed to reach agreement on the withdrawal phase are stupidly left to the definition of the future relationship including trade.

There has been a concerted effort to characterise the talks between both parties as negotiations, when they most clearly are not. EU member states have a rule-book to follow, into which bucket they can put pretty much what they like. Hence “negotiations” are immediately bogged down in endless complexities and little or no progress is possible. For reference this links to the wording: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/577971/EPRS_BRI(2016)577971_EN.pdf

Leaving aside for a second one’s own prejudices about whether to leave or remain, would anyone have seriously entertained this way of trying to reach any constructive agreement? The answer is likely to be a resounding No! Article 50 is inappropriate, designed only to protect the status quo ante.  It is therefore dysfunctional as a methodology and should have been challenged immediately or never triggered at all. This is not an exercise in flying a kite, Prof, Ingrid Detter de Frankopan, a widely respected international lawyer and Prof. Emeritus at Stockholm University warned back in 2016 that the one critical factor in then forthcoming UK/EU talks was to avoid triggering Article 50. It being so obvious that to do so would merely create a one-sided EU determined process.

This is precisely where we find ourselves in late October 2018, unable to exercise a sensible choice since EU tripwires have been carefully positioned so as to frustrate any progress. Worst of these, but by no means alone is the vexed question of the Irish border. It is fair enough to recognize that most member countries have historical oddities left over from Europe’s turbulent past. Andorra, San Marino, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg itself, Liechtenstein and a host of others.

Even by EU standards the choice of Ireland is an especially unfortunate (and completely avoidable) one. Not only because of the common travel area between the UK and the Republic, and the major flow of goods between the two countries, but quite obviously because of the potentially fragile Good Friday settlement. There are no good compromises here, only future technological border solutions, mainly way off, but because any sensible negotiations need to be bilaterally determined between the UK and the RoI- not the EU. Hooking themselves to the EU position will not resolve this issue and risks upsetting the delicate balance and trust built up between the communities in the North over the past 20 years as well as violating the sovereign status of the UK. This is massive overreach by the EU and they should drop it before any real damage is done.

I have previously critiqued the 4 freedoms as being aspirational constructs, not fundamentals. Even in a pre-globalized world free trade in goods and services was recognized as an economic benefit. Globalization has supercharged it to the extent that very little is not now tightly integrated. Free movement of capital and people has however become increasingly problematic. At one level technology renders borders as nearly irrelevant, however this is only part of the story, identity, culture and historical context all influence how peoples interact.

Monnet had a profound disillusion with the failure of the inter-war League of Nations and his philosophy was always for European integration and a federal structure, which became enshrined in the EEC and later EU. His was a very different world however and informed by very different experiences.

The current backlash against the inequalities created by the manifest downsides of a globalized world has led to a re-recognition of nationalism. It never really went away, although this is not properly recognized. Now member states are just that, national states. Those so-called freedoms of capital and people allow firms to relocate financial and production resources at will and with little/no consideration for the host country. Freedom of movement for people touted and even enjoyed as a benefit has turned out to be an authentic nightmare. Since a nation state’s first duty is the protection of its citizens neither the precarious nature of migrants, nor the self interest of firms should be allowed to override policy provisions by individual states. To do so is to invite mass uncontrolled movement, exactly what we have been experiencing. The combination of free capital movement and open migration have proved to be double edged swords. The consequences of being economically “left behind” and opening borders to uncontrolled movement are major causes of our decision to leave the EU.

In truth the EU was from inception always a Franco-German project and one where the UK played a reluctant and often marginal role, hence staying in to reform this 1950s project to make it fit for purpose in the 21stC is and remains a fantasy.

 

The EU/UK Stand-Off – An Epic Historical Muddle

12/05/2018

JR Max Wheel

As a divided UK wrestles with leaving the EU, it is worth reminding that many of the arguments for and against, over the power of a state to exercise its sovereignty dominated the debates prior to our accession to the then EEC. Many heavyweight politicians from both major parties worried away at the loss of national sovereignty and the fundamental differences in the way that laws are made under the UK’s unwritten constitution. The LSE’s Piers Ludlow has revisited this subject especially the debates of October 1971. Objections from the anti-EEC camp focused on three key areas, UK’s long-standing support for free trade, its internationalist stance and laterally the importance of making its own laws, as proposed and voted on by Parliament.

Interestingly much of the focus was on negative consequences for dominions and former colonies, whether sugar or banana producers in the Caribbean or lamb and butter from New Zealand and Australia, part of the terms of access and a deep-seated issue since the cheap food policy -the need to import food which lay behind the 19thC repeal of the Corn Laws. The “terms of entry” thus assumed a much bigger role than in any in depth assessment of what we were joining and serious public discussion of the terms of the acquis communitaire. The latter imposed a set of circumstances on the UK which included all EEC legislation back as far as 1958. Equally the aims and aspirations of the EEC towards a federal state were both well-known, but never made clear to the British electorate, rather it was presented much more as a trading bloc. This was a mix of sleight of hand, which rather echoes Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s celebrated comment on the proto-constitution contained in the Lisbon Treaty of 2004- “public opinion will be led to adopt, without knowing it, the proposals we dare not present to them directly”.

Failing to inform directly or acknowledge what was envisaged in the acquis was a grave error and the beginning of a long-lasting suspicion over the EEC and later EU that the British media exploited relentlessly, and it sowed the seeds of Euroscepticism, even outright hostility that are still with us.

The nature of the acquis is that not only would a large swathe of EEC agreed legislation from the original six members pass into English law, but thereafter under the terms of the European Communities Act of 1972, all manner of directives, directions and decisions (laws) and treaty obligations would pass into British legislation. Whether these were properly debated and critiqued by successive Parliaments is a moot point. Further interpretation of this body of law was to be subject to the interpretations and rulings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) effectively making the very point that the anti-membership debaters in 1971 feared.

Such a body of information, with its complexity easily passed over the head of much of the electorate who were sold the benefits of the EEC as a trading bloc, to escape the dire UK economic performance in the 1960s and early 70s. If it had been more carefully explained, there would have been a more realistic appreciation, if not necessarily whole-hearted support. In this way it uncannily mirrors the equally inept arguments used by both sides in the 2016 referendum.

Enlargement of the Community from 1980s and 2004 has brought with it a further layer of complexity, many aspiring members had limited recent experience of democracy, Portugal, Spain, Greece were recent dictatorships and the Central and Eastern Europeans recent escapees from the domination of the Soviet Union.  Their identities, cultural and history was often removed from that of the original members.

Finally, the nature of the now infamous Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty aka EU constitution was never designed to accommodate an orderly and voluntary withdrawal process by a member state but rather to seek actions against “rogue” behaviour by member states, e.g. suspension of the rule of law or similar violations.

That is why it was always the wrong forum for negotiations on the UK’s decision. Whilst it by no means excuses inept UK management of the process, the error was in triggering it and by so doing allowing a completely one-sided arrangement, determined entirely by the EU and creating endless wrangling. No international negotiations are like this except after defeat in a war. The omnipresence of EU laws is like a one-way ratchet whereby they have been caught up in every nook and cranny of UK life and law. It is like trying to reverse an industrial loom, the fabric is now an inextricable mix, where new problems and trip wires appear constantly. Much, if not all of this could have been avoided if the terms of the original deal had been properly presented and understood, for that successive Governments are intimately responsible.

 

European Disorder.

Reviewing Prof Simms New Statesman article 24-30 November 2017.

 

JR Max Wheel

30 November 2017

 

Amongst the near endless name-calling and brickbats over Brexit in the UK, a very interesting and insightful article appeared in the New Statesman this week, written by Prof. Brendan Simms, from the University of Cambridge’s politics and international studies department.

Since the UK remains so deeply divided on this issue, it is good to have a take on the EU which throws some light and not heat.

 

Most mainstream media outlets have pinned their colours to the Leave or Remain mast and hence are even less trustworthy than normal as sources of information, but have degenerated into presenting emotive and deliberately slanted presentations- click-bait.

 

Simms points out some important messages, one, that populism far from going away is now rife in many (most) member states, sometimes powerfully so, whether in the splintering of a broad political consensus; Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and Greece have suffered from it as well as the UK. Poland and Hungary are in near open revolt at EU rulings from Brussels. Worse still, there is now a strong regional identity issue in Spain over Catalonia, the North in Italy, as well as the ever-present issues between Walloons and Flemings in Belgium. This is disturbing as the EU was supposed to have substituted the nation state with the prospect of an overarching federal Europe. That now looks impossible. The creation of the Union to supplant the nation state was never the foregone conclusion that many of its proponents believed. Indeed, as Simms argues powerfully far from transcending the nation state, the EU has thrown a lifeline to it after a near death experience in two world wars of the 20th.C. De Gaulle viewed the Union as a “L’Europe des Nations”, not what its founding fathers envisaged at all.

 

Suddenly regions matter as well as nations. This is a unique achievement, the EU has spawned the very opposite of what it promoted, a “Balkanisation” of Europe instead of a cohesive Union.

 

In large part this stems from its messy single currency, which has aggravated many of the underlying economic issues between members since the Crash of 2007/8. This has driven up unemployment, meant that achieving competitive balance is impossible and works only in favour of the most advanced and productive countries, especially Germany.  So, we have a common currency and a common travel area administered by a de facto confederation, not a federation, and on frequent occasions, an agenda driven by a key member State, Germany or in the past, France. The founding Franco-German axis may rebalance or not, what is certain is that the status quo cannot persist in an era of mass migration, globalised trade in goods and services. Many parts of the EU economy are still not open, in services especially, but also in the protectionist tariff wall, which also masquerades as a harmonisation of standards. Such standards largely emanate from UNECE anyway and are transcribed into EU law.

 

Large swathes of industry in individual member states have languished economically, the economic decline being mirrored by the rise of an angry electorate, ready to punish its leaders for falling to recognize the economic damage or seeming to care much about it.

 

It is worth looking at the problem of post-election politics in Germany.  After 12 years in power as Bundeskanzelerin, Angela Merkel seems vulnerable. Never a political visionary, Merkel was always a cautious political manager, seeking a consensus, when she did act decisively according to her instincts, in opening the borders to a massive immigration wave, it spectacularly rebounded threatening to stymie a largely cohesive system. The Centre Right CDU/CSU party and the Centre Left SPD have been outflanked to the left and right. Far from being the bastion of free trade and stability in the wake of what is painted as populist upsurges in the UK and US, she is likely to be overwhelmed by it. Simms also uses an interesting analogy for these times, that of Klemens von Metternich, Austrian Chancellor after the Napoleonic Wars. Metternich’s aim was to stifle uprisings, contain radicalisation and revolutionary movements until it hit the buffers of the 1848.

 

Brexit was never the real catalyst for a break-up of Europe, even if some of its wilder promoters desired it, it was always the underlying political and economic factors affecting real people.

 

There are only a few choices, accept that there are limitations to the Federal Project as conceived or to try to forge a smaller and consensual European Union, which may have to be a lot smaller and economically, and politically cohesive. Even that is unlikely to be acceptable or sustainable without deep-rooted changes.

 

Corbyn’s Labour: an unholy mix of the seductive and the sinister.

JR Max Wheel

 

28 September 2017

 

The finale of the Labour Party conference in Brighton with its triumphalist rhetoric has shown, at least to true believers, that the party has found new energy and direction. Corbyn has surprised most critics that he is able to appeal across a much wider spectrum of British politics than one would have believed possible for an avowedly left-wing opposition leader. This is another populist movement, feeding off the backlash and division sown not only by Brexit, but also the sense of deep frustration and anger which has flickered on and off since the crash of 2007/8 and its subsequent austerity policies. It is easy to blame struggling public services on highly constrained public finances.

 

This is socialism dressed up in a way, which cleverly targets disaffected groups and exploits their grievances, but also highlights areas where many mainstream voters also feel distinctly uncomfortable, whether it be the housing crisis, cost of higher education, the badly implemented Private Finance Initiatives contracts (PFIs) or poorly performing privatised services, energy, railways and Britain’s most notorious sacred cow, the NHS.

 

Behind the scenes is a grouping of activists typified by Momentum, but strongly backed by the Trades Union, this vociferous group have effectively seized control of the Parliamentary Labour Party, its MPs and embedded it in the membership, now some 600,000. Momentum claims membership alone of 200,000 through 120 regional groups. The Governance of Momentum is via a National Coordinating Group of 26, which must include, BAME, women members as well as regional representation. It effectively sets the agenda claiming its legitimacy from its democratic base. Looked at another way, this group has made a highly successful power grab from the MPs, who will have to respond to this new Politburo. Unsurprisingly, Unions which have felt marginalised since the reforms of the 1980s are also committed to a grass roots led campaign to get Labour elected on a programme which by any standards is an extreme left-wing one. It is an anti-business, pro-worker, large State model which it sees as both necessary to counteract the excesses of the 1990s and 2000s, to rub out all vestiges “New Labour”, now seen as a revisionist aberration.  This, despite the fact that New Labour was arguably the Party’s most successful period in winning 3 elections, a feat that no Labour administration has ever done before. Momentum has been skilfully “managed” by media savvy political wannabes like ex-BBC Newsnight reporter Paul Mason and control freaks like Seamus Milne, son of ex BBC Director General and with the usual upper-crust educational background of Winchester and Oxford. Momentum carries within it all the hallmarks of class warfare, and committed Marxism.  It elevates disaster economies like Venezuela as an example of the people struggle and refuses to condemn terrorist outrages.

 

That the Party should have attracted such a large membership is an odd mix of opportunistic cultivation of the youth vote, depressingly often those whose views are understandably naïve and untutored, those who have a deep-seated loathing of capitalism and anti-establishment intellectuals, like Guardian columnist and author Owen Jones. The Corbyn Labour Party can exercise via its membership effective control over selection of candidates and even deselect them. There has always been an undercurrent of left wing politics in Britain as in most countries, it has rarely amounted to anything.  This time it is different. Use of social media allows dissemination of ideas cheaply and simply. In a period when “fake news” has become the norm and main stream media is often a megaphone for over mighty Press barons, the failure to expose and challenge the Labour Party for what it has morphed into, is utterly lamentable.

 

 

Death of a Chancellor and the struggle to maintain the European dream

 

JR Max Wheel

6th July 2017

 

On the 16th June 2017 Germany mourned the death of Helmut Kohl, the Chancellor who oversaw the reunification of Germany; perhaps he was not the greatest German post-war Chancellor, but one who will be fondly remembered for his down to earth qualities, domestic political acumen and the extraordinary responsibility of integrating the two Germanies of West and East into one cohesive country. His place in history will nevertheless be secure. Significantly he chose to be buried in the cathedral of Speyer in the heart of the Palatinate (Rheinland-Pfalz), by the Rhine and not in his native City of Ludwigshafen, further upstream.  The reunification, presaged by the implosion of the Soviet Union and the collapse of its vassal states in central and eastern Europe marked the true end of WWII and 1989 should rightly be seen in the same light as 1789.

Speyer Cathedral: Courtesy Wikipedia

After Germany’s disastrous history in the 20thC, the creation of the largest and most powerful economy in the EU was not greeted with universal enthusiasm by the former Allied Powers, in particular, France, the UK, Netherlands and Poland as well as in Israel. Indeed, the notion of unity – or “Einheit” was a near toxic word with its quasi Third Reich overtones, such that “die Wende” or change, transition was preferred.

Whilst the unification preceded the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, with its ambitious political and monetary aims, it placed France and Germany, effectively Kohl and Mitterand as the key representatives of the proto European Union. In the following years the costs of reunification meant Germany exceeded the threshold levels for debt enshrined in the Growth and Stability Pact: the first of many to violate them over the next 25 years.

Fast forward to 2017, and after years of feeble economic performance from France, it was now crystal clear that the leadership of Europe was de facto in German hands. It was not meant to be so, since it was rashly assumed, at least by France, that the EU would be a “German horse with a French rider”, reflecting France’s long-honed diplomatic skill and expertise and as the designer of many of the EEC institutions, which subsequently morphed into the EU.  This Franco-German axis has always been the core with other member states being important but peripheral, especially the UK, with its radically different history, political systems and law.

Why is this important? Mainly because the EU is now notably unbalanced in terms of relative economic strength and influence. It’s eastward and south eastward expansion to include Poland, Czech and Slovak Republics and the Baltic states to the Balkans and admission of Greece, Romania and Bulgaria has tilted it towards members whose history, culture and identities vary notably from the largely contiguous borders of the founding six. Those member interests are not necessarily those of the core, this is especially true of the Central European [Visegrad] Four, as well as the UK.

One is loath to add to the entire and poisonous Brexit debate whereby the UK voted to leave in a hotly disputed referendum, but it has to be understood that the desire if not the reality of a shared federal future, long a cherished dream of its founders, Monet and Schuman was never shared by the UK. Here lies an important ironical twist, the quasi Constitution, opposed by France, Ireland and the Netherlands and then hastily cobbled together as the Lisbon Treaty 2007 was never offered to the UK in a referendum. This was a major missed opportunity, since a putative EU constitution should have always been offered up to all member states’ electorates, but was cynically avoided in the UK or meekly accepted elsewhere.

Thus, no proper debate was ever held in the UK until its own in/out referendum. The British, ever the unplanned pragmatists thus did not get to engage on this fundamental aim which was always the core of the European Project. It is remarkable, but inexcusable that the powerful British media never elevated European matters and aspirations as either important enough to warrant serious discussion or to inform its electorate appropriately. Its outcome and consequences were both dramatic and less surprising in retrospect.

The UK is the first member to voluntarily withdraw from its membership. There has always been a long streak of Euroscepticism in Britain, but the fallout demands more than its tortuous disengagement under the one-sided and deeply flawed Article 50 procedures, it argues for a radical shift in British politics away from the adversarial first past the post system to a more consensual PR system and an overhaul of the Commons (viz. a massive reduction in numbers) and Lords ( abolition and substitution by a Senate comprised of all devolved administrations and England) which would reflect the wishes of all the constituent countries of the UK.  It is astonishing that the UK played a leading role in constructing a successful federal constitution for the then West Germany, but failed to recognize any need for change in its backyard.

The outcome for the UK is highly uncertain, as it is for much of the EU, but a collective failure of imagination and will may result in a sub-optimal solution for both, weakening both parties at a time when the old order and institutions that have prevailed since the end of WWII are reaching the end of their life span and usefulness.

 

 

Death of a Chancellor and the struggle to maintain the European dream

Real news for real people